







One day in April 1994 a remarkable event occurred in a small
village in thé Mchinji district in Malawi, where thc United
Démocratie Front was holding a political rally in préparation
for thé May 1994 général and presidential élections. The élec-
tions were going to be the first 'free and fair' élections in
Malawi after 30 years of single-party rule. People were gather-
ing in gréât numbers to hear what this newly formed opposi-
tion party would say. As a member of the Lilongwe-based core
group of United Nations international observers,11 was present
that day observing this rally where a large number of UDF
officiais, all in yellow blouses, happened to be présent.
Suddenly, I became aware that thé atmosphère became tense
among the officials and the général public when a group of
masked Nyau dancers appeared on thé scène and stopped about
a hundred mètres away from thé place of the rally. There they
hid themselves behind some trees and shrubs and started to
sing and ring their bells. They made it clear they intended to
dance where the rally was being held and began to work them-
selves into an emotional state, as is usually the case on such oc-
casions. People whispered to each another: 'Zilombo! zilombol'
(literally meaning: 'wild animais!'), and some officiais began to
move around nervously, confused about what should be donc
next. Clearly there was some fear that violence would break out
— which is common to Nyau dance occasions - particularly
against thé local population, who knew thé way thèse things can
develop. The UDF leaders, aware that they were holding a rally
180
Secret Worlds in Malawi 181
in an area where thé Nyau were strong, decided to bribe them
to allow thé political meeting to proceed. At intervals, piles of
Kwacha bank notes would openly be carried from thé UDF plat-
form to thé waiting Nyau, in the hope that it would be enough
to prevent the rally from being broken up by thé dancing. But
by 4 p.m., all the banknotes had gone and time had corne to end
the rally and make a fast exit.
This event may indicate that, apart from political there are
also spécifie cultural dimensions to thé process of 'democratiza-
tion' and to projects of international intervention in Africa such
as élection observing. Although political science studies of de-
mocratization in sub-Saharan Africa hâve become numerous
(see Buijtenhuijs and Rijnierse 1993, Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot
1995), studies of political culture hâve only received little at-
tention (notable exceptions are Schatzberg 1993, Martin 1993
and Robinson 1994). Most of the literature on the subject of
monitoring the democratie process deals with the inherent
problems of élection observing in Africa's recent democratie
transition processes (see Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot 1995: 51-2,
Geisler 1993, Meyns 1995, Hyden 1996, Bjornlund, Bratton and
Gibson 1992). Regardmg countries like Zambia, Uganda,
Kenya, Ghana and Malawi, the donor community increasingly
imposed political conditions for the continuation of aid and
fmancial assistance. In most cases, democratie changes were de-
manded, to be monitored by independent international organ-
izations. Election observation thus became a hallmark of
political conditionality (Geisler 1993: 630-1).
However, in their practical exécution élection observation
missions often turned out to be nightmares, as the procedures
they were supposed to witness were seldom in conformity with
Western idéal standards. Most authors therefore highlight the
intrinsic problems of élection observing, such as the many
ways in which élections can be rigged, absence of fraud-
résistant voter identification and registration procedures, con-
tradicting views of different observer groups during élections, and
difficulties in arriving at sound and univocal verdicts over the
free-and-fairness of an élection.
Indeed, the cultural implications of the imposition of demo-
cratie procedures and their monitoring are rarely being con-
sidered (Robinson 1994). Not without cynicism one could say
that whereas the nation-state has been called the 'black man's
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bürden' (cf. Davidson 1992), ils extension in ternis of a démo-
cratie System with all that is presupposed by it bas become a
'white man's bürden' in Africa. Indeed, many of the 'problems'
élection observers encounter in thé exécution of a démocratie
procedure boil down to a clash of cultures, and cannot be trans-
lated into 'mère' practical technicalities only. One such area is
thé recording of personal identities. Referring to Michel
Foucault's term, in his analysis of the development of the
Western nation state, the 'micro-physics of power' that the
state came to command when dealing with thé identity of each
of its subjects developed into one of its corner-stones in thé
West. Individuals with their name and identity became regis-
tered in records that represented a fixed and independent
memory. The state became centralized, lending a central core
or framework to this identity. Political authority became dépen-
dent on enlisting a majority of these subject identities as voters
in discrète élection procédures.
In comparison, however, much of this 'micro-power' of gov-
ernmentality is absent in the African context. Political author-
ity does not exist in this form (see Bayart 1992 and Schatzberg
1993 for an élaboration of this point), and a centralized state
with undisputed access to each of its subjects' identities does
not exist either. In Ghana and Malawi, for instance, thé two
countries m Africa with which I am most familiär, names and
identities of individuals are not frxed and are not recorded in a
state-controlled independent memory. Names and identities
rather exist on the basis of the person's social relationships and
the phase in life s/he is in. In such cases the often recorded
problems élection observers meet in establishing voters' identi-
ties should be partly explained in terms of cultural différences
in what the meaning and political significance of a centralized
state actually is and implies.
The literature on élection observing therefore faces a
problem in that it accepts the formation of nation-states as a
reality taken for granted, as a natural order of things, and along
with it a process of 'self-evident' democratie participation in
state power. The international donor community promotes the
establishment of centralized states in Africa as this belongs to
what it perceives as a global order of things. Hence it seeks the
imposition of democratie Systems which in the West have come
to be regarded as the only legitimizing procedure for the estab-
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lishment of a centralized state. Election observing primarily
appears to serve this purpose, irrespective of the cultural différ-
ences that exist in thé appréciation of political power and polit-
ical légitimation.
A fundamental question social scientists therefore face is
whether their efforts in suggesting ways of improving élection
observing are not in fact part of a rhetoric of power that persis-
tently defines cultural différences between African political
Systems and thé West as 'problems' and 'irregularities'. What is
required is a more culturally oriented approach which empiri-
cally seeks to understand when and how people perceive a
System as legitimate or illegitimate, or a spécifie procédure as
fraudulent or trustworthy. In other words, what is required is a
cultural exploration of normative schemes and imagination
before any sensible improvement in thé 'political tourism'
(cf. Geisler 1993) of élection observing can be suggested.
As a large number of studies of processes of democratization
in Africa have now been able to show, democratization is both
imposed and imagined. In most cases, international pressure to
democratize was met by a désire from local groups in society to
change thé System, a désire most of the time expressed in a
myriad of cultural ways. In further defence of cultural rela-
tivism hère, it is not at all clear from the literature what in
most cases thé local désire and imagination entailed with
regard to thé procédures that would lead to a démocratie struc-
ture; largely because they hâve not been studied yet. It is this
field of populär imagination with regard to élection procédures
- where cultural factors corne into play which usually remain
unnoticed by thé outside political observer — which I contend as
crucial to thé 'success' or 'failure' of any attempt at democrat-
ization of a society. In this sensé, what is striking in thé schol-
arly debate about thé democratization process in Africa is the
lack of attention to the significance of the 'secretive' and the
'imaginary' in local political culture. As a rare example,
Geschiere in his study of thé secretive in the context of
Gameroonian political changes notes:
The récent democratization movements are accompanied ...
by a véritable blooming in politics of occult forces. At the very
least, their political rôle is brought into the open.
(Geschiere 1995: 12, cited in Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot 1995).
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He provides various examples of the complex relationship
between notions of witchcraft, the occult on the onc hand and
démocratie procédures on thé other, which also have been
studied by Tall (1995) in Bénin and by Meyns (1995) in
Mozambique. Hère Meyns for instance points at the magical
cum ritual power of traditional healers with regard to the sup-
posed 'secrecy' of casting a vote in thé démocratie transition of
1994. He cites thé following report of the Moçambique Peace
Process Bulletin:
It is widely reported that Renamo has told peasants in its
zones that thé ballot would not be secret because 'curan-
deiros' (traditional healers) will know how people vote and
that they must vote for Renamo.
(Meyns 1995: 42, dtmgMPPB 1994, vol. 12: 8)
The relevance of this imagination also extends to thé Malawian
case. The two-staged process of démocratie change in this
country (in June 1993 the National Referendum, in May 1994
multi-party général and presidential élections) has mainly been
studied from thé angle of national politics and its différent
élites — political, religious and ethnie — that became thé impor-
tant players in the field (see Chirwa 1994, Gullen 1994, Kaunda
1995, Kaspin 1995, Newell 1995, Van Donge 1995). Few authors
have looked at the local understanding and perception of what
thé political change might mean to thé common people in their
own terms (see for instance Englund 1996 for a welcome excep-
tion) or by looking at the rôle non-élite religious groups played
in thé process (see, for instance, Fiedler 1995 and Van Dijk
1998a, 1998b).
It is, however, clear that in Malawi a local world of secrecy, in
which spécifie secret societies play a dominant part, suddenly
came face to face with notions of secrecy which are implied in a
démocratie procédure. In this chapter I intend to explore some
dimensions of what I will phrase as thé 'meeting of secret
worlds' in thé unfolding process of démocratie transition.
Obviously, an important subséquent question is what the
chances of success are for a Western-style democracy if local
worlds of secrecy remain untouched by such 'superficial'
processes of political transition, leaving thé deeper structures of
political culture virtually unscathed.
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Although much more should be said about thé fact that
secret worlds and societies may remain intact and in place after
a process of démocratie transition has taken place, thereby
lending support to a thesis of cultural continuity, the focus of
this chapter is explicitly on thé implications for élection observ-
ing. It will explore some dimensions of this 'meeting of secret
worlds', thus bringing a spécifie cultural perspective to thé un-
derstanding of what observing élection procédures and political
compaigning actually meant in thé local context.
On the one hand, democracy and the démocratie exécution of
an électoral process, ideologically and practically, imply and
présuppose secrecy. Behind thé prescribed 'démocratie procé-
dures' — with a distinctly Western cultural origin and logic and
not immediately translatable into a local African setting - there
is, however, a world of the imaginative, of différent connota-
tions and meanings. The local understandings of what secrecy
in voting is, what it 'guarantees', by whom it is protected and to
whom it allows political access, may thus hâve distinct features
as compared to Western political understandings.
On the other hand, in Malawi, as in other Central African
countries, communities hâve their own cultural models, organ-
izations and social groups of secrecy, one of which, the secret
society of the Nyau, is the most important example. In many lo-
calities, secrecy relates to hidden powers — 'powers of the earth'
(zinthu za kunthaka) - to which one cannot gain unmediated,
direct access. Those who gain access to such powers of secrecy
are mostly perceived to be in a state of moral ambiguity. In this
sensé, witches, healers/medicine men, chiefs, and members of
thé Nyau secret society do not differ much as far as common
perceptions are concerned. In thé process of democratization
therefore, domains of secrecy and imagination seem to meet,
whereby thé rôle of thé élection observer, as I hope to show in
this contribution, can perform mediating or intermediary func-
tions between thé two.
In thé first section, a chronology of events is presented
leading up to thé démocratie transition in Malawi in 1994. It
will be shown what importance thé established mainstream
churches had in this process and how they paved thé way for in-
ternational élection observing. One of thé issues hère is that
thèse mission churches from the very onset of their présence in
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Malawian society have waged a battle against Nyau and its se-
cretive world of ritual practice, initiation and violence. In thé
following section more is explained about thé linkage between
Nyau and thé political machinery. In thé final section sonne con-
clusions will be drawn concerning thé rôle of international élec-
tion observing in a situation whereby those involved as
observers are hardly aware of such a meeting of secret worlds
which the advent of democracy in Malawi de facto entailed.
CHURGHES VYING FOR DEMOCRACY
Starting in March 1992, a démocratie révolution took place in
Malawi which in 1994 led to the removal from power of
'President-for-life' Dr Kamuzu Banda — until then, one of the
longest-surviving dictators in Africa. Banda's regime had for 30
years been marked by a despotism which a badly-informed
foreign press often described as 'benevolent', but which in
reality rested on systematic repression. Âlthough Malawi was
one of the ten poorest nations in thé world, its government
managed to operate and maintain very efficiently-organized
police agencies. The only political party allowed in the country,
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), was in direct control of
paramilitary groups, particularly the widely feared Malawi
Young Pioneers (MYP) and thé intelligence services. Moreover,
in thé years following independence in 1964, gradually and sys-
tematically, ail connections with thé outside world were brought
under the aegis of the Banda-controlled police apparatus, free
news-gathering by both thé domestic and foreign média was
made impossible, the intelligentsia was silenced and interna-
tional exchange of people and ideas was drastically curtailed
(see Williams 1978, Médard 1991). In view of all this Malawi
came to be known as thé 'Albania of Africa'.
The first free élections, held in 1994, led to the victory of one
of the new opposition groups, thé United Démocratie Front,
and its leader, Bakili Muluzi, forced Dr Banda to step down as
president. Although they condemned thé many incidents of
intimidation which preceded thé élection period, thé élection
procédure itself was greatly commended by national and inter-
national observers, média and intellectuals for its remarkable
freedom and fairness and virtual absence of any form of intimi-
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dation. Compared with preceding instances in Zambia and
Kenya, thé Malawian élections appeared to stand out, and were
highly praised as such, for the fair reflection of 'the will of the
people' they seemed to offer.
In thé period immediately preceding thé élections, thé estab-
lished churches of Malawi, particularly thé Roman Catholic,
Presbyterian and Anglican churches, had begun to play a
significant public rôle in thé process of démocratie transition.2
At the same time groups representing the 'traditional' political
culture also starled to make their voices heard. In what follows,
I shall be looking at both thèse developments, particularly at
what they meant for thé cultural significance of international
élection monitoring.
Under thé rule of président Banda, churches and other reli-
gious organizations had become the only places where people
could meet in an atmosphère of relative freedom from close po-
litical supervision. Other types of independent social or ideo-
logical organizations had gradually been subjected to the
MCP's political control, and their freedom to meet was seri-
ously curtailed. This did not mean, of course, that churches
were free to criticize thé régime openly, as thé Jehovah's
Witnesses experienced in the late 1960s when they were bru-
tally expelled from Malawi for publicly questioning thé legit-
imacy of Dr Banda's rule. The MCP's paramilitary youth
groups, thé Malawi Young Pioneers, were sent against thé
Jehovah's Witnesses and forced many of them to seek safety in
neighbouring countries. Unconfirmed reports still speak of
hundreds killed in thèse pogroms.
Although thé large established churches in Malawi had, since
independence, largely gone along with what thé régime ex-
pected of them, they nevertheless formed one of the few chan-
nels through which reports of the regime's use of terror against
thé population could reach thé outside world. In addition, start-
ïhg in the late eighties, a growing protest began to be heard
Mithin the Roman Catholic church against thé worsening econ-
«fmic situation in Malawi and the increasing gap between the
woor majority and thé small political élite, which had been very
sùccessful in filling ils own pockets. The first big push in this di-
, rection came from thé Papal visit in 1989. Not so much because
- of anything thé Pope actually said - his speeches remained
rather uncritical of thé Malawian government - as from thé
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discussion brought about by thé renewed attention for Malawi
from thé international média as a resuit of the coverage of the
visit.
In March 1992, following secret discussions within thé clergy,
thé Roman Catholic Bishops published a Lenten-letter in
which they, for the first time in post-independence history,
protested against thé repression, poverty and harassment of
political opponents that had become thé trademark and resuit
of 30 years of Banda's dictatorship (see Gullen 1994, Newell
1995, Nzunda and Ross 1995, Lwanda 1996). As had been the
case for other parts of Africa (see Schatzberg 1993, Diamond
1993, Witte 1993), in Malawi thé religious élite called for a de-
mocratization of thé political System. This represented thé first
truly open criticism of the Banda régime for many years. The
blâme for thé increasing poverty in the country was placed
squarely on the shoulders of the failing political System and
thé policies it enforced. Corruption, censorship and officially-
sanctioned political violence were roundly condemned in un-
ambiguous terms.
The appearance of this Lenten-letter rocked thé government
profoundly and landed the country in a deep political crisis. It
was, after ail, thé first time that an organisation had been able
to publish a critical appraisal of the political and économie situ-
ation at more than 2,000 places throughout the country without
any of thé many branches of thé secret services getting wind of
it. The political élite reacted violently and, as they did at all
other instances when dissenting voices could be hcard, deployed
thé MYP to intimidate Catholic clergy and church members
and to install a général reign of terror against ail who wanted
to take thé protests further. Locally the Nyau society, sometimes
in collaboration with thé MYP (see Englund 1996: 117) also in-
stalled a reign of terror in an attempt to influence and curb thé
growing popularity of the religious and later the opposition
group's protests (Kaspin 1995: 617, Van Dijk 1998b).
Although thé bishops and thé other parties involved were ini-
tially denounced by thé régime as criminals, and thé police in
many parts of the country started to round-up anyone they
thought might have a copy of the letter, there was sufficient in-
ternational pressure to ensure that in thé months that followed
thé government did negotiate with thé religious leaders. At this
point, représentatives of the other establishcd churches in
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Malawi, with the help of international mediators, were also able
to join thèse negotiations with thé government.
The aim of the churches in entering the negotiation was to
bring about a democratization of Malawian society in the hope
that this would bring a halt to the continuing spread of poverty.
A greater participation of the population in political decision-
making, freedom of thought, freedom to form political organ-
izations and political parties, free élections and a dismantling
of the répressive paramilitary organizations, particularly those
of thé youth organizations, were placed at the top of the long
list of objectives thé churches presented to thé government.
The churches, with the help of a number of other civil organ-
izations, established thé Public Affairs Committee (PAC) which
provided an umbrella-function to thé opposition groups that
slowly began to émerge in varions parts of the country (Ross
1995: 31—2). The PAG began to negotiate thé terms for an even-
tual démocratie transition with thé Presidential Committee on
Dialogue (PCD), and by November 1992 at the so-called
'Kwacha-Conference' an understanding was reached. A
National Referendum was to be held on thé issue of changing
from a single to a multi-party System. The country's opposition
was allowed to form itself into 'pressure-groups' which were
given thé liberty to présent their views in public and to run
campaigns. In reality, however, intimidation by thé two political
youth-bodies was rife and proved to be extremely effective in
ciosing off entire districts from activities and propaganda mate-
rial of the opposition (Englund 1996: 116-19, Kaspin 1995:
617).
Thèse two oppositional groups were named thé Alliance for
Democracy (AFORD), with a stronghold in thé Northern
Région, and thé United Démocratie Front (UDF) with a power-
base in thé South and who, as was mentioned earlier, gained
victory in thé général élections in the end. At the same time,
both thé government and the MCP, as thé only légal political
party, would spare neither effort nor expense to persuade thé
Malawian population of the advantages of staying with a one-
party state.
As thé 'pressure-groups' were still rather weak in their organ-
izational structure and resources, the churches, the Roman
Catholic and thé Presbyterian in particular, ran the better part
of the multi-party campaign: they negotiated a 'free and fair
M
'M
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process', mobilized massive support particularly from thé youth
(see for thé implications on generational power-relations Van
Dijk 1998b, Englund 1996: 120), and distributed civic éducation
material, monitored thé registration and voting centres, and re-
ported cases of intimidation and harassment or any other viola-
tion of what in the negotiations had been agreed upon (see for
différent aspects of the churches' involvement on varions levels,
Gullen 1994, Newell 1995, Nzunda and Ross 1995). It became
extremely fashionable to wear and show the insignia of the
PAG, which were a mixture of Christian symbolism of the cross,
the rosary, and the nyali, the lamp, as the sign of the light that
multi-partyism would bring against the powers of the dark that
came to be associated with single-party rule (the symbol for thé
MCP was the black rooster, or in local parlance the 'black
cock').
As I myself witnessed many times, PAC youth spend hours
and hours on civic éducation, in explaining to the elderly people
in the villages that 'mattipatty' was not just another party but
instead an entire different System that would allow greater par-
ticipation in the political running of the country. AFORD and
UDF rallies were usually opened by young PAC représentatives
who in prayers and religious songs would request the benevo-
lent heavenly powers to lend support to their just cause.
However, in many parts of Malawi a reign of terror from the
combined sources of MCP paramilitary groups, the MYP in par-
ticular, the local chiefs and party-headmen and local Nyau
groups continued, which to a large extent went unnoticed by
outsider agencies (see Englund about the secretive forms of op-
pression in local communities, 1996: 116-19). It was in this
period (first quarter of 1993) that international pressure began
to bring this still fragile democrati/ation process to the conclu-
sion desired by, amongst others, the donor-country community.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stood
guarantee for the international and independent monitoring of
the National Referendum, while the churches took charge of
thé local monitoring, working through the new opposition
groups. The UNDP supervised the registration of voters and or-
ganized the media campaign and programme of civic éducation
that preceded the referendum. It also provided the logistical
and fmancial support for thé whole opération. The élection
monitoring would also monitor the opération of the UNDP and
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other services associated with it. The UNDP effort was partly
supported by thé Dutch government and thé author became
one of thé first two international observers sent from thé
Netherlands to join thé UNDP team in Malawi.
The referendum itself was held in May 1993 and two-thirds
of the Malawian population voted for a change to a multi-party
System. In the months that followed, the pressure groups
managed to become recognized as legitimate political parties
and new, until then unknown, political parties were permitted
to operate. The new political parties worked with the churches
to negotiate with the government for the first free général élec-
tions, which would include an élection for the head of state.
Despite the outcome of the referendum, it should be stressed
that in the second half of 1993 the machinery of political ré-
pression remained menacingly present. There was still no
freedom of speech, the new political groups had little access to
the media and the logistical and financial resources available to
tjtiem - in contrast to those available to the government - were
iijsufficient to reach and mobilize supporters in every part of
tfte country.
• isThis, then, was the situation when in December 1993 a
dppute between soldiers and members of one of the governing
> péùtïty's paramilitary youth groups, the Malawi Young Pioneers
» (3jpiTP), got out of control in a northern town. The army, which
? mterestingly had been able to maintain a markedly indepen-
dent position within the existing political structure, seized its
chance and began a hunt for members of the MYP paramilitary
organizations that lasted many days (Van Donge 1995: 9,
'Lwanda 1996: 183—90). Eventually, after a number of fierce,
t^Sömetimes deadly armed struggles, the power of the paramili-
Ffary organizations was broken and some of their members fled
• -'jibroad. (More than 2,000 of these well-armed paramilitaries
>*£fe$ently occupy former territory of the Renamo guerrillas in
^Mozambique - there had always been strong links between the
paramilitary and RENAMO, dating from when the
still controlled important parts of the border with
The genera! and presidential élections were moved back to
and the first half of that year was marked by a clear
in the number of incidents of intimidation and political
. Freedom of speech was slowly extended by a reluctant
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government and opposition groups gained more acccss to thé
média. 'Givic éducation' was set up to inform thé public about
thé rather complicated électoral procedure the various parties
had eventually agreed to, and about thé positions of the various
political parties and presidential candidates.
As thé élection time drew closer, thé largest political parties
seemed to differ less and less on matters of policy and, instead,
increasingly began to reflect thé régional and ethnie identities
of their supporters (see Forster 1994, Chirwa 1994, Kaspin
1995, Van Donge 1995 for a further analysis of the intertwined
ethnie and régional dimensions of the élection results). The
governing MCP seemed to draw most of its support from
thé central région of Malawi, the traditional homeland of the
Chewa. This is the ethnie group to which Dr Banda and the
most important members of his political elite always had
claimed to belong (for locally held critical views of the supposed
Chewa ethnie background of Banda see Lwanda 1993, Englund
1996). The Tumbuka-speaking northern région seemed to be a
bulwark of AFORD, and the party's political leadership — in-
cluding its leader, the trade unionist Chikufwa Chihana - still
consists mostly of Tumbuka speakers. The southern région has
become the heartland of the UDF, which gets much of its
financial and logistical support from the Indian population
living in the main urban and commercial areas located in this
part of Malawi.
The élections were won by the UDF and the presidential
campaign was won comfortably by the UDF leader Bakili
Muluzi, a member of the Islamized Yao-ethnic mmority in
Malawi which since Independence had been marginahzed under
Banda's ethnie policies (see Thorold 1997 on the Yao's dissent-
ing position). The élections also made it plain that Dr Kamuzu
Banda was a spent force in Malawian politics. The way m which
the élections were carried out, the discipline of the millions of
voters and the remarkable radio speech in which Dr Banda ac-
cepted defeat, received genera! international praise. Apart
from a number of incidents, partly caused by a group of
Commonwealth Observers declaring the élections 'free and
fair' before counting the cast votes had even begun m some dis-
tricts (see also Geisler 1993 for profound criticism of the
Commonwealth Observers' problematic participation in other
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instances of democratie transition), the élections were judged
by the international observers to have been sufficiently
well conducted to allow them to be regarded as reliable.
(Irregularities which required voting to be repeated were found
in only two districts.) Even the transfer of power to the new
UDF-dominated government went fairly smoothly.
The attention of international news-services was drawn to
Malawi again in 1995 when a committee of investigation
brought out its report of inquiry into an incident in 1993 that
had taken the lives of one minister and a number of members
of parliament. In that year they had all fallen from grâce with
Dr Banda and their bodies were later found riddled with bullets
at the bottom of a ravine in Mwanza-district. A judicial com-
mission tried to have Dr Banda arraigned on grounds of direct
involvement in the killings, but his failing mental and physical
condition led the court to décide to dismiss the case. This was
.- not an isolated incident and international critics have pointed
out that the judicial commissions in Malawi so far have had
little success in bringing to trial those responsible for past polit-
ical crimes.
In genera! terms it is safe to say that Muluzi's government
; still deals with a legacy of open and covert political coercion and
- violence. In remote areas the power of the former MCP party
., chairmen continues to be significant, despite their defeat in the
" général élections and despite the UDF control of all govern-
,' njlfeht positions. Usually, these party chairmen, unofficially but
<~ effectively, still form the main contact persons for outside agen-
cfês, NGOs for example, as they maintain to have the longest
. expérience in dealing with such exchanges. Other éléments of
i,, Jhe former political culture, in which secret societies played an
;-"*important rôle such as chiefly authority at the village level,
-stiave likewise remained largely unaffected by the democratie
jes at the national level and it is here that the cultural
If^oüstruction of secrecy is a dominant factor. Secrecy belongs, so
-g*'(ospeak, to the ground layer of the local political culture, and it
^- was clear from the onset of the democratization effort that the
'rüiternational organizations had very little understanding of its
,*?,&alieiice. In the following section this aspect of the local politi-
^fcal culture in its confrontation with a Western-inspired demo-
X'ÜTratization process is further explored.
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POLITICAL CULTURE, SECRECY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION
Returning to thé moment when thé first international observers
arrived in Malawi, thé micro-political process that unfolded can
be described and analysed as a meeting of two 'secret worlds' -
that of 'democracy' as it is understood in thé West, and what
might be called thé dominant , partly traditional, political
culture. To begin with thé latter, from thé inception of his rule
Banda continuously referred to thé cultural values and political
traditions of thé largest ethnie unit in the country, the Chewa,
and took the Chewa models of authority as the idéal for the
post-colonial political order hè intended to create. Vail and
White note:
As a cultural broker for the Chewa, Banda had a broader
vision, however, than formulating an ideological statement
for his ethnie group alone. He has instead equated
'Malawian-ness' with Chewa-ness, and hè has depicted the
Chewa as the very soul of the country.
(Vail and White 1989: 182)
Within this 'reconstructed' political tradition the Nyau secret
society was and still is perceived as a key institution belonging
to the very heart of its culture (Kaspin 1993: 54). Only initiated
men are members of the society. When they appear at impor-
tant public occasions the Nyau group consists of masked
dancers, drummers, the akapoli (free running guardians of the
performance/helpers) and others who m their normal outfit
participate, sing songs and clap their hands. The masked char-
acters are known as 'animais' (zilombo), whereby some of them
indeed represent animal figures, while others represent a
mockery of important social, political or religious types (for in-
stance, a man dressed up as a white lady and wearing a white
facial mask; see for a fuller picture of Nyau symbolism: Aguilar
1996). The masked dances were and still are particularly per-
formed at certain rituals, such as funerals, girls' initiation cere-
monies and installations of chiefs.
However, in large parts of Central and Southern Malawi thé
authority of traditional leaders such as village headmen and
chiefs is underwritten by thé Nyau not in thc performative
sensé, but rather in thé sensé of a masked and concealed form
of control and coercion. Developing from forming thé backbone
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of traditional authority, it became after independence in 1964 a
secretive instrument of oppression by Banda's government at
thé local village level. Close connections were developed
between village headmen and local party chairmen, hence
between respectively Nyau and thé Malawi Young Pioneers who
became very central in thé exécution of authority for thé local
MCP party cadres.
In many villages, thé Nyau mainly exercised coercive political
power at night and as unrecognizable strangers. Writers who
have described these acts emphasize thé ritual terror and occa-
sional political murders the Nyau carry out, and which usually
rarely came to light in thé daily world of formai authority (see
Schoffeleers and Linden 1972, Linden and Linden 1974,
Schoffeleers 1976). Englund, writing from his expériences in a
village in the Dedza district just prior to the élections, gives a
vivid account of what became common practice in the imple-
mentation of coercive government régulations:
Although village headmen and local party officials were re-
sponsible for seeing that the orders of the government were
obeyed, the harshest measures of coercion were usually left
for strangers and, significantly, for the masked characters of
Nyau. The so-called party membership renewal campaigns
were initiated by party chairmen in villages, but because they
seldom succeeded in persuading all villagers to renew their
memberships, the names of défiant villagers were passed on
to officials in other areas. These officials, strangers to the vil-
lagers m question, came to visit their houses during the
night. They were often accompamed by members of the
Malawi Young Pioneers ... or by zilombo, If the door was not
opened, the visitors would break into the house. If its occu-
pants still refused to pay for the renewal of their party mem-
berships, the visitors confiscated property in order to cover
the costs of renewal. The possibility of résistance was ex-
tremely limited. The Young Pioneers were notorious for their
readiness to use violence: the sight and sound of zilombo m
the middle of the night have prompted many villagers to
make, in horror, the required payments.
(Englund 1996: 117)
Professor M. Schoffeleers mentions in personal communication
that m the Central région the group ofakapoh usually was made
up of young 'hooligans' who either with or without the formal
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consent of the Nyau elders to a large extent were responsible
for forms of uncontrolled terror. In thé Southern part of Malawi
where Nyau is also active, thé young were much more re-
strained and some Nyau groups would prefer not to hâve akapoli.
In ternis of a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that
in pré-colonial and colonial times with the advent of missioniza-
tion a dispute developed between the mainline churches, the
Roman Catholic in particular, and thé Nyau societies. As
Schoffeleers and Linden (1972) show, thé missionaries tried to
'save' the younger génération from hidden and heathen rituals
at which Nyau was involved, to turn this génération into thé
bulwark of new nationhood, thé génération from which thé
leaders of tomorrow would émerge (see also Mandala 1990:
154). fighting Nyau in this way became a way of contributing to
thé building of the nation-state.3
However, in the coming to power, after independence, of
Banda and the MCP régime, a mirroring process occurred. As
Ross (1969) has shown for certain types of witch-hunters in
Southern Malawi, Independence became the time of revealing
the concealed and of turning what once was concealed into an
element of public nationhood. In Southern Malawi mbisalila, a
spécifie type of witch-finder, began operating, usually invited to
villages by local headmen and by the new party cadres. The
terni mbisalila refers ioku bisa, the act of hiding, and to bringing
out into the open (ku tuluka) of what once was hidden. In other
words, political power on thé village level made it clearly un-
derstood that it could command, control and bring out into the
open what once was hidden through another powerful force:
witchcraft (ufiti).
At the national level, at public ceremonies and célébrations
where Dr Banda would be présent, Nyau dancers paraded out
into the open, such as that of the huge Kamuzu Stadium in
Blantyre, for ail too see; thé initiated as well as thé uninitiated.
For Banda, displaying and applying thé hidden éléments of a
central cultural héritage, formed an essential element in pro-
moting Malawian nationhood.
With it, however, thé antagonistic relations between thé
regime and the mainstream churches were revealed. As I argue
elsewhere (Van Dijk 1998b) thé mainline churches increasingly
were curtailed in controlling or influencing thé position of the
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younger génération in the development of Malawian nation-
hood. From the onset of the Malawian independent state, post-
colonial nationhood locally associated itself with the effective
political force of Nyau as something 'of the government' (see
Englund 1996: 118). The regime took a position as a protector
and defender of this secretive political tradition against other
forces, among them particularly the power of the mainline
churches. Indeed adding to the perception of the Nyau societies
as the signs and symbols that constitute the 'substructure of
rural Chewa consciousness' as Kaspin defines it (Kaspin 1993:
54), a deliberate political and ideological dimension was intro-
duced to the relationship between coercion and secrecy in
Malawian society. To use a felicitous phrase from Taussig, in
these public displays there was an element of skilled révélation
and of skilled concealment: the state displaying a spécifie 'sélec-
tion' of its secretive political apparatus while concealing the
rest of it from the public gaze.
The 'formal' political power exercised by the MGP and its
leaders during its years in power was not perceived by the
local population as being fundamentally different in opération
from the political power of the Nyau. Both were just as likely
to be described in terms of witchcraft which, in its way, was
not really very surprising. After all, people simply 'dis-
appeared' without any kind of explanation being offered as to
their fate, open political discussion of any kind was forbidden,
and real power remained the preserve of initiated individuals.
Political power was exercised by bringing out into the open in
the villages the zilombo (the wild animais), who would
then coerce people into participating in the compulsory politi-
cal rituals of the ruling MCP party. Like witchcraft as a power
of the night, political power hence 'devoured' people, killed
and destroyed property, while effective protection was hard to
find.
The great majority of observers4 who arrived in Malawi in 1993
were not aware of this cultural dimension of the political situ-
ation. Their activities were coordinated by the UNDP in
Malawi, which, of course, had other priorities. During the élec-
tions themselves, the observers were mainly concerned with the
technical aspects of running polling stations and concentrated
on monitoring those parts of the électoral process most open to
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fraud. Prior to thé élections they needed to pay a lot of attention
to thé way in which political activities were carried out in
public, in order to assess whether freedom of speech and of
political organization really was being taken seriously by the
authorities. The cultural dimension of Malawian politics there-
fore tended to be overlooked.
Nevertheless, observers present just prior to both élections
(the referendum of 1993 and thé général élections in 1994)
were increasingly tipped off by local monitors about the
influence thé secret society could hâve on thé élections. Under
the aegis of the PAC, de facto thé mainstream churches, thèse
local monitors were sent by thé political parties to keep an eye
on thé procédures and to report irregularities to their party
or to thé PAC. They tended to corne from nearby villages
and urban districts and were therefore familiär with thé local
political situation.
In some places thé international observers, for instance, were
told that the Nyau had threatened to turn up at the polling sta-
tions before they opened, in füll dress, complète with ritual
masks. The implication of this, which may not have been ap-
parent to the non-Malawians, was, firstly, that thé Nyau would
then be 'taking possession' of thé location, which would then be
inaccessible to non-initiates and, secondly, that ritually sanc-
tioned violence against thé local population could resuit. In
other locations, thé Nyau threatened to turn up and demand to
inspect thé ballot papers. Since the balloting procedure con-
sisted of removing thé ballot paper with the svmbol of the se-
lected party and disposing of the rest in a sealed box, it would
be immediately apparent which party someone had voted for if
the remaining papers were taken out of the polling station. In
this way, the Nyau sought to control the voting m favour of one
party. Elsewhere, it was rumoured that the Nyau would be
placing 'magie eyes' in polling booths.
In a way, as I argued elsewhere (Van Dijk 1998b), the system
of local monitoring, as organized by the PAC, ailowed the main-
stream churches to move back in again, influencing the younger
generation's political position within the Malawi nation. It was
clear that these young, zealous local monitors would react
strongly against the threats of Nyau in the process of democrat-
ization. Englund writes of a village in the Dedza district of
Malawi:
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The tensions over the appearances in MCP rallies [of Nyau]
became apparent shortly before the referendum. Junior
members [of the Nyau] were increasingly reluctant to force
villagers to attend rallies, and some even refused to dance
there. At least some members were afraid that they could be
attacked by angry supporters of the multiparty cause. Thus
according to this view, a complète inversion was possible;
instead of being feared for their fierceness, zilombo would
themselves be attacked by villagers.
(Englund 1996: 118)
An example like this should make it clear that political tension,
next to its more open and manifest forms, is also expressed in
ways that are indirect but quite perceptible, and it is the latter
aspect that gave all the familiär problems of élection observing
a(language barrier, administrative préoccupation, logistics, po-
litical pressure) a spécifie cultural dimension. Local monitors
^indeed engaged themselves in a process of skilled révélation
(namely to thé international observers) and of skilled conceal-
ment (that of Nyau threats) on the basis of a very différent po-
litical objective as compared to, and running counter to, that of
the ruling party and its regime. The term 'skilled' here received
a double meaning as local monitors became skilled in terms of
the training they received (organized by the PAC), on how the
élection procedure was set up, on how monitoring should be
conducted, and in terms of the academie skills of reading and
writing which were expected of them. On the other hand,
'skilled' here also has the meaning of mastering the techniques
by which Nyau and MYP acts of intimidation could be reported
to higher authorities and the international observers without
running the risk of becoming the next targets of political viol-
-ence. The hope and expectation was that the international ob-
" servers in their turn could report such matters to the Electoral
Commission which would have the authority to intervene.
Although the Electoral Commission was informed by the core
' group of international observers and in addition also had its
Own< sources of information in the country, as far as I am
aware, traditional authorities were never confronted by the
"Commission to curtail the activity of the Nyau in particular.
, Subsequently, and despite the local monitors' efforts in laying
bare the concealed forms of coercion and violence, writers
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familiär with thé influence and social dynamics of the Nyau
hâve pointed to thé considérable overlap between thé areas
where thé Nyau remained active and thé districts in which thé
MCP enjoyed électoral success (see Kaspin 1995).
From thé point of view of the local population, the arrivai of
multi-party élections brought thé new, unknown and secret
world of 'democracy' into view, next to thé 'old' secret world of
the Nyau. Under the old power monopoly of the MGP, the local
population 'voted' by openly and publicly supporting one of the
candidates put forward by the regional MCP council. In other
words, the MCP did put forward a slate of candidates and the
winner was simply the one with the largest number of support-
ers lined up next to him. In this way, it was quite obvious who
had voted for whom, and commonly the government would brag
about the openness of its 'democratie' system.
At the referendum and the général élections the voting
booth, the ballot paper, the envelope and the sealed ballot box,
however, appeared to evoke only rather poorly understood
notions of électoral secrecy. For instance, observers would cer-
tainly report as an 'irregularity' two persons seen entering a
polling booth (usually this happened if one person intended to
assist another person in the complicated procedure of casting
separate votes for the parliamentary and presidential élections,
while not being aware that 'secrecy' prohibits this) Moreover,
for many people it was not at all clear what the concept of
multi-party democracy actually meant in the first place.
'Mattypatty', as it is called in the local longue, was seen by
many, and particularly the older génération, as 'just another
party' and not as a system for making a choice in secret of one
of a number of parties and one of a number of candidates.
It was therefore not surprising that during the negotiations
between the PAC and the government about the form the élec-
tions would take that the MCP insisted that instead of 'secret'
voting, the voters would line up behind their preferred candi-
date in the traditional way. Although, obviously, they were only
acting out of self-interest, hoping that people would be intimi-
dated into supporting them, in populär understanding it indeed
signalled a relationship with the dark, hidden world of politics
which had threatening connotations for many Malawians. In
spite of the 'openness' in voting in the MCP system, politics and
political activity had long been associated with a violent, coer-
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cive and dark world of powers from which protection was almost
impossible to find. Dark, hidden and secret dealings belong to a
realm connected with witchcraft and amoral behaviour that
fears thé light of day. In thé PAC campaign of promoting
'mattypatty' the symbol of the nyali, the lamp, was therefore
well chosen, as it contrasted light with dark, thereby turning
thé secrecy of thé démocratie system into something morally
acceptable.
The international observers were, in my expérience, often re-
garded by thé local people and by thé local monitors as persons
with spécial, almost esoteric knowledge about the rituals of
democracy and their intricacies. Particularly for thé local moni-
tors the international observers remained persons who could
not become subject to, nor engulfed in, the secretive machin-
ations of the Nyau and intimidation by the MYP. The source of
power and authority of the international observers remained
unaffected by thé local political forces and lay beyond thé local
political System of control. Furthermore, the international ob-
servers were clearly initiated into thé secrets of how the démoc-
ratie System could be tricked and what ways there were to
influence thé resuit of thé élection by means largely unknown to
tlfe local political system. International observers therefore
sojmetimes became part of local powerplays in which local moni-
toîfS, young men as they usually were, attacked the power of the
'old' bearers of authority (a case of this nature has been de-
soribed in Van Dijk 1998b) under thé protection of the ob-
sejrvers. Local monitors zealously sought to be 'initiated' in thé
kaowledge about thé secrets of thé démocratie system, thé ways
iiis which esoteric means could be applied by those opposing
mattypatty to befraud thé élection procédure.
Jln some cases, as I myself experienced, local monitors of the
oppostion groups in particular seemed to be suspicious and am-
biguous about thé international observers' position. After all,
such knowledge could also have been placed in the hands of the
ruling party, the MYP and even the Nyau for that matter, giving
these groups an advantage over the local monitors and the op-
postion groups they represented. The international observers
ttaturally responded to this by going into lengthy technical ex-
jslanations of such things as what can go wrong with registra-
fion cards, but they remained under suspicion as holders of
potentially dangerous, almost esoteric knowledge about the
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rituals of democracy and the ways in which certain 'techniques'
could be applied affecting voting behaviour. International ob-
servers hardly ever saw themselves as bearers of such secretive
knowledge and seemed not unaware of their culturally mediat-
ing position between thé two worlds of secrecy in which they op-
erated. Such positions, which in society are occupied for
instance by medicine-men and chiefs (as they médiate between
the world of men and the world of the ancestors and their
spirits), are always regarded with ambiguous feelings of esteem,
respect, awe and fear. The long présence of international ob-
servers in Malawi (for nearly two years in ail), through which
they became increasingly aware of at least some of the dynam-
ics of local culture, and in addition thé fact that international
observers gained access to places where ordinary Malawians
never dared to go (such as MYP bases throughout the country),
lent force to such feelings of ambiguity.
On the side of the Nyau societies, it has remained unknown
how they reacted to thé présence of international observers to
whom their acts of intimidation surreptitiously were reported.
There are, however, indications that the power of the secret so-
cieties, as the backbone of traditional authority, has remained
largely unaffected by thé démocratie change and Implementa-
tion of a new political structure after 1994. It is only recently
that scholars have begun to record the Nyau's responses to the
process of democratization on a systematic basis, as thé présent
political situation in Malawi seems to allow for thé exploration
of this field of study once heavily embargoed (personal commu-
nication with Prof. Schoffeleers) .5
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I hâve argued that in understanding thé process
of democratization in Malawi, and perhaps elsewhere for that
matter, the exploration of the secretive, the hidden and the
concealed needs to be included. They form part of thé cuitural
understanding upon which local normative schemes and per-
ceptions have been built. In discussing the rôle and position of
the observers with regard to the élections in Malawi, I have
pointed out that there was in fact on the local level and in the
perception of the local population a meeting of two secret
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worlds. It was a meeting of which thé observers themselves
were hardly aware, but which at the same time made them
subject to a culturally perceived position as représentatives of a
political order which présupposes secrecy. In exploring their po-
sition in thé Malawian local political culture, first of all, the rôle
of secret societies needs to be taken into account. Particularly
in thé Central and Southern régions, where the ruling MCP
had to been forming local alliances with the Nyau, the Nyau had
been making it clear from their actions that both the tradi-
tional authority of the chiefs and headmen and political power
in général were something exercised in secret. The interna-
tional observers only became gradually aware of this local polit-
ical culture. For thé greater part thé international observers
only received note of such forms of intimidation by Nyau and
MYP groups as second-hand information through thé local
monitors; and their means to respond to it were indeed very
limited. Other than occasional reporting to thé Electoral
Commission in charge of the entire élection effort, thé relative
and cultural distance between thé international observers and
thé local political practices prevented deeper interaction.
i, Secondly, democratie rituals themselves, as introduced
through thé intervention of outside agencies, appeared to hâve
their own secretive dimensions in the eyes of the population,
and thèse were therefore not always immediately accepted (for
instance, in some cases people would insist they wanted to go
into thé polling booth only if accompanied by somebody else).
This being the case, democratie rituals were not directly sep-
arated from thé partly tangible and partly imaginary world of
hidden evil forces to which local forms of political intimidation
-^for instance, Nyau magie eyes in polling booths - alluded to.
JrSome important insights émerge from thé Malawi expéri-
ence. In order to perceive and understand thé more subtle and,
te'Western eyes, often somewhat 'irrational' ways of influencing
v|»ter behaviour, it would be advisable if élection observers hâve
Ère time to get acquainted with fears and anxieties of theB t al population as they exist both in thé realm of 'day' as well
afjfin thé realm of thé imaginary. The observers in thé Malawi
Case had inadequate knowledge of the local culture and lacked
sufficient time to prépare themselves adequately for it.
Moreover, attention to thé 'non-rational' and thé imaginary in
local culture was lacking as well. This led to an over-emphasis
i
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on thé more 'rational' technical aspects of the élection with thé
resuit that thé actual observing, as was the case in Malawi,
ended up narrowly focused on élection procédures, usually con-
centrated in thé periods just before, during and for a few days
after thé élections. To hâve a good chance of uncovering the
more subtle and cultural forms of intimidation and influencing
of voters, the observer would certainly need to be présent for a
longer time before thé élection and preferably in one place.
Secondly, in support of Geisler's conclusions (1993: 634) thé
local monitors are crucial in thé empirical understanding of
local populär culture and its normative schemes. With their
continued présence, their broad-based composition and their
very broad coverage of thé entire élection process and thé
polling stations, they would be thé idéal partners of foreign ob-
servers. As Carothers also notes:
Domestic élection monitors, if properly organized and pre-
pared, hâve important advantages over foreign observers. ...
They know thé political culture, thé language, and thé terri-
tory in question and consequently are capable of seeing many
things that short-term foreign observers cannot.
(Garothers 1997: 26)
But as Geisler correctly said, this partnership is obstructed by
the fact that they remained in thé margins of funding by thé in-
ternational community and in thé shadow of their foreign col-
leagues as far as proclamations on the conduct of the élection
are concerned (Geisler 1993: 634). Certainly in Malawi thé con-
tinued lack of financial support for their activities as well as thé
persistent surreptitious threat with regard to their activities
from thé side of thé Nyau and MYP affected their stamina.
Hence there is a great deal to be said for an increased and
direct partnership between local monitors and international ob-
servers in ail thé aspects of the élection observing effort.
Further, Nevitte and Canton (1997) make a plea for an in-
creased sensé of complementarity between domestic and inter-
national observers. Instead of pointing at thé 'dangers' of the
local background and political bias of domestic observers, they
stress thé fact that becoming a local monitor may provide 'ordi-
nary' citizens with greater knowledge of the 'nuts and bolts' ol
thé démocratie process (ibid.: 58). In my contribution, however
I have hopefully been able to show that there is no one-wa^
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process. It is not only domestic observers who have to be led
into the secrecies of what a démocratie System implies and pré-
supposes, but it is also the international observers who need to
hâve a much greater sensitivity to thé secrecies of a local politi-
cal culture.
Thirdly, with regard to the effect of the internai observing ac-
tivities in Malawi, thé conclusion should be that despite their
lack of knowledge of the local political culture, thé interna-
tional élection observers contributed to thé process precisely
because of their intermediary position. In their contacts with
local monitors, surreptitious acts of intimidation could be pre-
sented and openly discussed, information on thé various means
of 'rigging' thé élection procédures could be shared and ques-
tions on some of the technical aspects of thèse procédures could
be answered (in fact half of my time as an international ob-
s'erver in Malawi was devoted to such 'educational' activities as
explaining what the complex voting process consisted of, what a
discard box actually was meant to be, and so on). In this way,
both thé international observers and thé local monitors would
feel that their status, efficacy and safety were enhanced by
mutual close contact and collaboration. The général conclusion
from thé Malawi case therefore should be that close partner-
ship will prove to be bénéficiai to a deeper empirical under-
standing of local political culture and thereby of the
effectiveness of international observing.
The élections, finally, led to a greater regionalization and
ethnicization of Malawian politics (see Chirwa 1994, Kaspin
1995). When thé élection resuit became known, thé consé-
quences of the heavily regionalized voting were regularly and
widely discussed amongst thé UNDP's élection observers.
Would the country fall apart into warring régions, with an
AFORD-dominated North, a UDF-dominated South and a still
vïgorous MCP in control of the Central région? Despite thèse
concerns, the UNDP présence, with all the civic éducation and
média support services that went with it, ended soon after thé
élections, with thé resuit that thé organization did not remain
to look at how thé results would be accepted.
To judge from thé developments - or thé lack of them - in
Malawi in thé second half of 1994 and into 1995, it looks as if
, élections and democratization hâve remained two quite
différent things. The old political culture of the former MCP m
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(particularly its gérontocratie nature: see Van Dijk 1998b) have
remained largely intact, albeit in a somewhat altered form.
This continuity takes many forms, among them thé continuing
influence at village level of thé former MCP party chairmen
and thé way that many important members of the old political
élite hâve found themselves a place within thé UDF. Freedom of
news-gathering for thé sole radio broadcasting corporation is
still not in place, and Malawi remains the only African country
without TV: a direct legacy of political thinking under the
Banda régime. In addition, the power of the Nyau secret society
- which helped form the backbone of traditional forms of au-
thority in large parts of Malawi - remains virtually unchanged
and contributes to a picture of substantial continuity surviving
in spite of élections and democratization. No public debate has
ever started on thé legacies of that political culture and thé
atrocities that took place in thé period of 30 years of dictator-
ship that shaped this spécifie culture. Neither is there a public
debate about thé tenets of what democratization in Malawi is
supposed to mean and what thé places of Nyau and traditional
authority is to be. So far there has been no indication that thé
new government of Bakili Muluzi is prepared to step into this
arena, as it remains preoccupied with defending itself againsl
thé many accusations of undemocratic government it receive!
from thé national and international communities. This onc<
more seems to be an indication that thé local political culture i
of greater 'resilience' than some had hoped for after thé adven
of démocratie change in this country.
NOTES
1. The United Nations Development Programme brought together
group of observers from a variety of Western and African countrii
under thé umbrella of thé JIOG (Joint International Observer Grou
that also assisted thé Malawian Electoral Commutée in thé executk
of the élection procédures.
2. The rôle of thé established churches in Malawi's démocratie transidi
is by no means unique. See Buijtenhuijs and Rynierse (1993: 65) a'
Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995: 59) for a discussion of the acti
influence of particularly thé Roman Catholic and various Protesta
churches elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
3. It needs to be specified hère that thèse local political conflicts betwe
thé Nyau and thé churches mainly relate to thé Central and Southt
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parts of Malawi. In the much smaller Northern région of Malawi,
where thé Nyau were absent, local-level contestation between
Christianity and traditional authorities developed very differently
(see McCracken 1977). Nevertheless, Christianity contributed to thé
development of a national elite most importantly through the estab-
lishment of thé first institute for higher éducation in Malawi in this
particular région.
4. The distinction between observers and monitors is that, as will be ex-
plained in more détail below, observers came from outside Malawi to be
placed under thé authority of thé JIOG (see note 1), while monitors
came from within Malawi and were operating under the aegis of the
PAC. Thèse local monitors therefore either could belong to one of
thé opposition groups, or to the ruling party (MCP), or to one of the
churches which were involved in PAC.
5. Particularly for thé Central région, where the Nyau appeared to have
been developing a rather marked symbiosis with one of the three
Presbyterian Synods, thé so-called Nkhoma Synod, which remained
loyal to Dr Banda during thé process of democratization, scholarly
reflection may lead to further insight on how local political formations
react to extraneous processes of intervention. Despite being stränge
bedfellows, this case (information through personal communication
with Prof. Schoffeleers) of a covert alliance between thé Nyau and
members of thé Synod may show, although détails are yet to be re-
vealed through study and research, how such indigenous political for-
mations forge new and créative alliances to curb external intervention
and to préserve internai political supervision.
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